It’s unfair to blame Europe’s crisis on lazy Greeks, argues Alan Shipman. Industrious Germans are equally to blame.
Rightly concerned that a crisis in the Eurozone could stifle any British economic recovery, David Cameron has been telling continental colleagues how to rebuild their economies. But his prescription – public spending cuts, pay freezes, less regulation and tougher welfare eligibility tests – has only worked in Europe’s smallest economies, with one notable exception.
Austerity’s greatest successes have been in the tiny Baltic Republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which have a combined population of only 7 million). They reduced their wages and tightened their budgets during a deep 2009-10 recession, and were rewarded by bounding back to growth in 2011. Even so, the belt-tightening exemplar Estonia is now moving its budget into deficit, to help it keep growing as other Euro economies grind to a halt.
The notable exception is Germany, which since unification has trimmed its traditionally generous welfare state, reduced its labour protections to create one of Europe’s most flexible labour markets, and driven up efficiency so that it can still build machines and computers that compete with the Chinese.
Germany’s productivity, growth and wage discipline have restored it to being the world’s largest exporter in relation to its national output. It could soon be the biggest in absolute terms, as China’s export surplus shrinks. Large current-account surpluses – when a big economy exports substantially more than it imports – have always destabilised the world economy.
The world recession of the 1970s was triggered by large Gulf state surpluses after the cartel raised the oil price. The slowdown of the late 1980s followed the relentless growth of Japan’s surplus. And China’s external surplus is now blamed for feeding the West’s boom and bust, by draining demand from Europe and America and only restoring it with unsustainable credit growth.
But the oil-exporting states learnt to curb prices in order to keep the industrial economies growing – a mutual interest once their surpluses were invested in those economies. The Japanese and Chinese surpluses were a transitional feature of developing economies. Japan’s has already been reduced as an ageing population expands its consumption; and China’s is similarly dwindling as rising incomes (and a rapidly ageing population) allow it to absorb the production it once had to sell abroad.
Germany’s export surplus, by contrast, is an anomaly among rich industrial countries. It results from the world’s most productive industrial workers also being among its most reluctant consumers. This frugality is set to increase as Germans – the first big nation to put Greens into government – take a lead in reducing their carbon and other chemical footprints.
'the world’s most productive workers are among its most reluctant consumers'
German output per person is higher even than the US (when shorter working-time is factored in). Yet whereas American households saved just 5% of their income last year, Germans put aside almost 12%. Because it produces so many goods and services it doesn’t consume, exports account for around half of Germany’s national output, and were the main source of its 0.5% first-quarter growth.
The resultant German surplus is the obverse side of the deficits that are sinking Greece and Portugal, and could soon drag down Spain and Italy. It builds a deflationary bias into the Eurozone, and is the reason that electorates all across Europe have now voted against the austerity measures Germany wants them to take.
The Confederation of German Employers protests that Germany’s exports mainly go outside Europe, and that its sales within the Eurozone are mainly of capital equipment that helps other countries boost their own production. But Germany still pre-empts the export sales now desperately needed by Italy, Spain and other growth-starved economies, and is pushing the Eurozone into an external surplus that’s a drag on world growth.
Voters don’t always choose options that are economically achievable, but this time the alarm they’ve sounded is entirely reasonable. The ‘fiscal pact’ to which Eurozone governments have signed up requires them to rein-in their budget deficits, at a time when falling real wages and rising unemployment risks are forcing households to do the same, and profitable businesses aren’t investing because there’s no demand for any extra production.
This solution, though warmly endorsed by David Cameron, can only work if it results in a strong rise in exports. But with the US now reducing its own current-account deficit by consuming less and exporting more, there is nowhere for a rising European export surplus to be sold.
The UK returned to growth in 2009-10 in part by letting the pound fall, and boosting its exports to the Eurozone. The Eurozone is too big to do the same, and can only revive by raising its own – which mainly means Germany’s – internal demand.
Forcing Germans to consume more would be neither feasible nor ethical; raising their wages might push them towards this, but employers have no reason to do it, and extra pay is likely to be saved rather than spent in the current despondent climate. Forcing Germany (and the comparably export-intensive Dutch) to leave the euro, and adopt a new currency that could appreciate against it, might make some economic sense but is a political non-starter.
So last week’s G8 summit pushed Germany to invest more, and to put additional capital into institutions like the European Investment Bank that can do so, especially in Europe’s poorer and more indebted regions. In an ideal monetary union, this would be done through a central federal budget, and financed by genuine ‘euro bonds’ issued jointly by the 17 member states.
Ironically, that’s just what George Osborne and his Treasury team have started to advocate, for the Eurozone – and there are belated signs that, faced with a double-dip recession, they may be contemplating comparable fiscal relaxation for the UK (see this Daily Telegraph story. But any additional funds they assign to investment will be ruthlessly chopped from welfare and other government consumption. If excessive austerity does indeed destroy the Eurozone’s recovery prospects, that will only increase the Coalition’s appetite for it at home.
Alan Shipman 23 May 2012
Alan Shipman is a lecturer in Economics at the Open University. He is responsible for the modules You and your money:personal finance in context and Personal investment in an uncertain world, part of the foundation degree in Financial Services.
The views expressed in this post, as in all posts on Society Matters, are the views of the author, not The Open University.
Cartoon by Catherine Pain

